Remarks on the philosophical Relationship between Psyche and Techne and on the Beginnings of the modern History of Technology
I. Perspectives of Ancient and Early Modern Philosophy on Human Opportunities and Crises
In a famous tale of the German age of Romanticism entitled Der Sandmann, the writer E. T. A. Hoffmann describes a confrontation between man and machine. The physics student Nathanael, the protagonist of the story, falls madly in love with a girl named Olimpia. In his eyes, Olimpia has all the qualities one could wish for. Nathanael ignores the quiet misgivings of those around him that Olimpia seems peculiarly rigid in her movements and looks. As he sees in Olimpia the person who understands him completely, it is not surprising that he proposes to his beloved. Of course, readers can guess the end of the story: Olimpia is not a real girl, not a person of flesh and blood, but a lifeless doll, whose eyes subsequently break due to an unfortunate blow. Nathanael cannot find his way back to normal life after this incident. He falls into madness, from which he never really recovers, and finally throws himself to his death.[i] The message of the narrative is readily apparent: a human being encounters a soulless automaton, which in turn imitates a human being. The soul consciousness of the student Nathanael, with all his emotions, desires and hopes, comes to nothing. Soulful sensation and mechanical technology are irreconcilably opposed.
Turning to occidental cultural history against the background of this critical narrative on the relationship between “psyche” and “techne”, a different picture emerges. The failed confrontation between man and automaton described by E. T. A. Hoffmann represents only one particular aspect in a far more complex history of development, which is based on manifold traditions and sources.
In fact, a look at the Old Testament, and especially at the history of ancient philosophy, shows that reflection on the terms “psyche” and “techne” is an essential part of religious and philosophical interest, since these terms address such important topics as man's position in the association of living beings, divine action in the cosmos, mortality and immortality, as well as the rational structure of being and thinking.
As an interface between antiquity and modernity or the present, the early modern period shows the extensibility and range of variation of the ancient models. In this context, the traditional models of “psyche” and “techne” or “anima” and “ars” provide diverse impulses for mechanization that point to the modern age and new positioning of man. Opportunities for human self-understanding become just as visible as crises and the necessity of new self-discovery.
II. Traditional Models of Psyche and Techne as Foundations of the Early Modern Period
Biblical Psychology
If we attempt a brief sketch of essential religious and philosophical presuppositions of early modern concepts of the soul, the Old Testament offers an influential model of biblical psychology. The Yahwist tradition emphasizes the dual nature of human beings, with emotional and cognitive components in addition to the body.[ii] The basic term characterizing this particular aspect is “nepes” or “nefes”, the breath of God, usually translated as “soul”.[iii] Not surprisingly, this approach has far-reaching consequences, both for man’s self-understanding and his technical use of nature. Mankind’s soul sets them apart from other living beings, empowering them to rule over all non-human creatures by the anthropological difference thus constituted.[iv] This is a starting point for the legitimation of man’s dominion over the lifeworld he finds.
Concepts of “Psyche” and “Techne” in Ancient Philosophy
Ancient philosophy includes prolific reflections on the functions of “psyche” and “techne”. In his writings, Plato offers a wealth of aspects concerning, among other things, the ethical task of good living, the question of the immortality of the soul, and the presence of the soul as a world-soul in the cosmos.[v] In general, the soul is understood as a rational entity capable of perceiving ideas and, as an expression of the divine, is independent of the mortal body, yet giving life to it in the first place.[vi] In connection with these considerations, then, another complex of themes arises, in which moments such as life, true knowledge and proper technical handling are considered to be connected. In particular, the Platonic thought of the world-soul specifies the intimate relationship of these components. The world-soul is an expression of the skill of the “world-builder” (demiurgos),[vii] who, in the exercise of this very skill, grants the soul the most beautiful mode of action in the cosmos. In effect, this technical activity realizes itself by conveying ideal, mathematical structures to the soul, whereby these structures supply standards for the essential cosmic courses of motion. The soul is placed in the center of the spherical body of the universe, into which it pours forth uniformly and moves circularly. As a result of this technical animation or, as it were, this reversing animating technique of the world structure by the world-builder, the unique circling heaven comes into being as a recursive, self-referential and self-sufficient work of divine action.[viii] Finally, elsewhere Plato characterizes all of nature as the product of divine “techne”, as distinguished from the imitative “techne” of man.[ix]
Aristotle only follows these observations to a certain extent. Unlike Plato, he considers the soul as “form” (entelecheia) or as “first completed reality” (energeia) of a body, which can possess life.[x] Based on this hylemorphistic approach, later more concisely rendered by the formula “anima forma corporis”,[xi] the function of the soul is thus linked to the life of a real body. Subsequently, the interaction of body and soul establishes the concept of a living organism that does not admit any dualistic view, in other words, neither anunbalanced priority of the immaterial soul over the body nor, conversely, of the physical being over the soul.[xii] A separation of the soul from the body, insofar as it is conceived as the completed reality of a body, is not possible.[xiii] On the basis of these conditions, Aristotle then also establishes a connection between soul and technical skill. The term “organon”,[xiv] which can be interpreted both in the sense of an animate, organic, functional unit and as an artificial tool, serves as a link between the soul and technical skill. Evidence of this double meaning is the hand as part of the body, which, according to Aristotle, is considered the “tool of tools”. In a certain sense, just as the hand is able to grasp different objects and, moreover, alone makes all tools functional by wielding them, the soul – through the faculties of mind and perception – can also be identical to everything that exists.[xv] Thus, Aristotle ensures, via the analogy of soul and hand, the comprehensive relation of man to his environment, oriented to the functions of the living, which can be grasped in a mental, sensual and practical way.
In Neoplatonism, the thoughts of the predecessors live on in their own processing. Especially Plotinus defends the Platonic concept of the world-soul as the animating and moving principle of the cosmos.[xvi] Admittedly, in Plotinus’ thinking, the world-soul acquires manifold characteristics, mainly principles of order and unfolding. Thus, Plotinus considers the sphere and the circle as consummate forms that are expected to function as comprehensive, representative, structural and ordering principles of thought and being. In this sense, the sphere represents the three authoritative Neoplatonic hypostases “One” (hen) – “Mind” (nous) – “Soul” (psyche), which are inextricably connected. The divine One, or the absolute good, forms the center of the sphere, while the Mind embraces the center of the sphere as a motionless circle; finally, the Soul moves in a circle around the center in its desire for the hypostases superior to it.[xvii] Whatever is and can be thought is thus combined into a universal, mentally unmoved and, at the same time, soul-moved structure of thought and being. Thus, the activity of the Soul intensifies to a noetically inspired activity, which converts the ability of the unmoved Mind into circling dynamics. Furthermore, one might add that the Soul’s noetically inspired activity to dynamic conversion is borne out by its ability to form series. Thus, the Soul, as the third hypostasis after the non-thinking One and the self-thinking Mind, denotes the discursively structuring faculty of thought responsible for the orderly unfolding of the One and the Mind into material manifoldness. In this sense, Plotinus occasionally asserts that the Soul possesses all properties of number, insofar as number has its origin in the hypostasis of the One, which multiplies into a noetic duality via the mind’s self-differentiation into thought and thought-content, to then constitute the soul’s successive, discursive thinking as it counts one object after another.[xviii] Thus, mathematically ordered, unfolding processes of noetic consciousness come to the fore through the activity of the Soul. The circular motion, attributed to the Soul as an expression of its animating, cosmic activity, connects with the successive, law-like structure of thinking steps, thereby giving rise to the first technical possibilities of a mathematization of thinking consciousness. The tendency of the lawful order of mind and soul is further strengthened by the thinker Proclus, also classed as Neoplatonism. Thus, Proclus develops a series of triads, which transform the cyclic processes of the unfolding of the mind into a system of ternary relations such as “beginning – middle – end” (proton – meson – eschaton) or “remaining – procession – reversion” (monê – prohodos – epistrophê).[xix] As if it were a “writing tablet of the mind”, the soul unfurls the circling thoughts of the mind into a continuous, progressive sequence of single steps of thinking.[xx] The processes of the mind and the soul can thus be described as a structure of generating processes, which – closely interrelated – run in cyclic recursion as well as in a linear sequence.
III. Ambivalences of “Anima” and “Ars” in the Development of the Early Modern Period
Emphasis and leveling of anthropological difference
In the early modern period, previous traditions are carefully studied and received. However, this is not a simple repetition of what has already been said, but an active appropriation of the traditional models – now integrated into new contexts as the relationship between “anima” and “ars” – which may well be differently motivated or even ambivalent.
If one follows the considerations in detail, initially the theme of man's self-assurance, and the existential meaning of the significance of his soul connected with it, leads to peculiarly opposing concepts. Of course, biblical psychology, which distinguishes man as a creature of God because of his animation before all living beings, also finds continuation in the thinking of the early modern period. In the philosophy of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, for example, the biblical statement is intensified by the thought of a further divine gift, in that the divine Creator also declares man as the Creator. According to divine will, man alone is allowed to form himself as a creative sculptor, choosing whether to develop into an animal or a heavenly being. The faculty that fulfills this disposition to self-creation is the human “soul” (animus),[xxi] which decides on the path of development. Thus, the human soul proves to be not merely the link between beast and human existence, but also the essential condition of human free will and dignity. In the last consequence, the soul becomes the interface of decision in an underdetermined, specifically anthropological scope of decision, in which man can freely dispose of his form of life and even satisfy his desire for an immortal existence in the proximity of God himself.[xxii]
If Pico della Mirandola’s approach reinforces the construction of anthropological difference in that neither beastly nor celestial creatures have the unlimited freedom of choice and creative self-empowerment of man, Giordano Bruno puts man in a different light. The background of Brunonian thinking is the idea of the world-soul, known from antiquity, which is now put into the new context of the infinity of the universe, said to contain an infinite number of worlds. On the basis of these considerations, Bruno concludes that an inexhaustible, vital life principle is present in the totality of the universe, communicating its animating power not only to the earth but also to innumerable other celestial bodies.[xxiii] As the one world-soul (anima del mondo), this force signifies the one universal principle of form, which, inextricably connected to the one matter, brings forth and shapes the totality of all possible things.[xxiv] In his further deliberations, Bruno connects in the concept of the world-soul the idea of artistic activity and living organism as a unity that governs the infinite universe. The rationality of the world soul acts as an “inner artist” (artefice interno), which naturally does not become active in bondage to inanimate material or to a certain matter but, as an inner principle of matter, forms the organs of all living beings and combines them into meaningful organisms.[xxv] In this sense, Bruno also regards the world-soul as an acting mind that, as the “art of the arts” (ars artium), makes everything or, as the “first art” (prima ars),[xxvi] ultimately constitutes the substance of nature. The universe becomes “a great living being” (grande animale),[xxvii] in which art and nature, or even skillful action and product of nature, are intimately connected. From here, it is no surprise that the position of man within this universal organism must be reconsidered on the basis of these premises. Consequently, Bruno regards mankind not unlike all other formed living beings, as a product of the world soul, which creates all living things in inexhaustible activity, while disregarding possible hierarchies. As snakes, fish, mice, deer and the whole animal kingdom thus come into being, so too does man, essentially no different to animals.[xxviii] Inasmuch as the world-soul continues to bring forth all beings from within in successive change, reabsorb them and release them anew in a new formation, all living beings are understood not only as momentary expressions of the same continuous creative process, they simultaneously form a chain of materially and intellectually related formations. In summary, with these notions, Bruno sees no reason to fear death since, through the never-ending interplay of matter and soul, no being passes away entirely but is transformed. Admittedly, this optimistic view of a material-soul imperishability goes hand in hand with the leveling of the anthropological difference and the associated elevated position of man. If, in a certain sense, reference is still to be made to an anthropological difference, this is not based on a divinely founded superiority of man. Rather, the decisive factor is a bodily construction that equips man with “tools” (instrumenti)[xxix] that other living beings do not have. The significance of the hand, propounded by Aristotle, becomes virulent in this context so that man asserts his special position not by virtue of his intellectual abilities but of his organically technical abilities.
Knowledge expansion and soul machines
One theme that preoccupies the early modern period in an equally ambivalent way is the idea of bundling everything that can be known and presenting it in its entirety. In this context, the term “ars” takes on a significance of its own. Above all, the modes of unfolding developed in Platonism and Neoplatonism in connection with the cyclic and triadic structure of mind and world-soul are transposed into technical-artificial programs that serve to mechanize knowledge.
One relevant example of this development is Ramon Llull’s Ars generalis ultima and its shortened form Ars brevis, which were written at the beginning of the 14th century. Inspired by the Christian zeal to convince the unbelievers of Judaism and Islam of the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation with the help of human rationality, Llull constructs with his conception of “ars” a scientific taxonomy that seeks all propositional judgments of a field of knowledge by using the method of combinatorics. The conviction that the reality of God and creation – according to the Neoplatonic concept of mind and soul – is laid out in triadic dynamics in the manner of the maker, the makeable and the making is crucial for the practical realization of the project. Consequently, the form of the circle and the circular movement traditionally reserved for the soul represent for Llull the suitable material basis for generating the sought-after truths that is now used in technical practice. For example, when attempting to establish fundamental statements about theology, basic concepts of the divine being are laid out in substantive and predicative form on revolving, concentric circular discs of decreasing diameter on the peripheries. If one then rotates the circles in opposite directions, all possible combinations of noun and predicate can be produced by mechanical means. In a similar construction, the possible aspects of the triadic relations of being can be elicited and all results obtained be recombined among themselves.[xxx]
Over time, of course, the early modern period has shown manifold variations and extensions of this mechanical program. Applications can be found both in the concepts of the “art of memory” (ars memorativa), which regard the memory as a storage system,[xxxi] or in drafts of universal sciences, which combine the Llullian approach with the claim to everything knowable, to be made available with the help of suitable methods.[xxxii] The modern tendency towards mechanization is complemented by the idea of interpreting the whole universe and natural creation as a “world machine” (machina mundi), that is, as an expression of a mechanically interpretable system of rules.[xxxiii] One particular example of the modern reception of the Neoplatonic mode of operation of the world-soul through the circle and number can be seen in the unfolding process as assumed by Giordano Bruno in his late work on the “monad” (monas) or unity into multiplicity.[xxxiv] Under the altered conditions of an infinite universe with infinite possibilities of realizing entities, Bruno conceives the entire work of nature with its innumerable drives and impulses as a circular expression of the soul.[xxxv] However, it is no longer sufficient to refer to the movement of a single circle to represent this inexhaustible activity of circling in a model. Consequently, Bruno tries to illustrate the inexhaustible activity of the soul by a system of circles that multiplies analogously to the successive explication of the series of (natural) numbers. However, since the processual activity can go on and on, and is ultimately unfinishable, Bruno attempts to reduce the endless process of generating circles to the formulation of the law of process formation. The fundamental construction used in this process consists of an initial doubling of the circle by using a compass to draw one circle, then another, with a constant setting of the radius, whereby the center of the second circle lies on the periphery of the first. The procedure can then be repeated on the basis of the newly created circle. Thus, this indicates the use of construction rules to determine the course of generation processes. Processes of self-reproduction, series progressing by the type of number, repetition of construction steps or even considerations of meaningful termination criteria in an endless process thereby gain importance.[xxxvi]
On the other hand, however, the technical possibilities of expanding knowledge and generating processes also contain potentials of disquiet that affect mankind in a new way. The idea of understanding the human soul itself as a machine, operated analogously to the “ars memorativa” by certain techniques, is essential here. Thus, the concept of the soul-machine comes to the fore, which, in the age of rationalism, finds its own climax in comparing the soul with a clock's movement.[xxxvii] Against this background, it is only a small methodological step in the further course of cultural history to confront the mental capacities of the human soul-machine with factual machines and their possibilities of mechanically generating or storing knowledge. Thereby, it becomes apparent that, around the time that the mechanization of combinatorics becomes possible, man and his natural memory lag behind the capacity of machines. Humans cannot achieve the quantity of combinations or match the speed of the processes performed by the machine.[xxxviii] To sum up, therefore, man cannot fulfill his desire for knowledge optimization and its free availability using his own natural endowment but only by delegating to a machine he has set up.
Empowerment of the human ego and mechanization of the human body
The extent to which the modern era wrestles with the question of the soul can be seen not least in the unresolved question of its mortality or immortality. In 1513, deeply troubled by the fact that the reception of Aristotelian hylemorphism propagated the soul’s attachment to the body and thus its natural demise, the 5th Lateran Council called on philosophers to defend the immortality of the soul. In response to this appeal, René Descartes devoted himself to obtaining the requested proof.[xxxix] The procedure that is supposed to lead to the desired result is, as is well known, conceivably strict. Radically applying the “methodological doubt”, Descartes dissolved the Aristotelian concept of hylemorphism into its components. The soul, or mental consciousness of the human ego, is detached from its originally organic connectedness with the body, which no longer appears necessary as a carrier of the cognitive acts. As a “thinking thing” (res cogitans), the immaterial consciousness is juxtaposed independently and dualistically to the body as an “extended thing” (res extensa).[xl] Admittedly, achieving the separation of the “res cogitans” from the “res extensa”, and the associated possibility of the soul’s independent existence, has far-reaching consequences, which become manifest based on the ontological status of the body. Thus, the resulting mind-body dualism offers specific possibilities of mechanization, especially with regard to the organization of the body. Accordingly, Descartes clearly formulates the view that the body is merely a “machine of limbs” (machina membrorum)[xli] or a “machine of earth” (machine de terre),[xlii] which God endows with appropriate, machine-like organs and functions. By locating the human body in the materially extended world, it is concluded, a bodily concept emerges that no longer conceives of the body in biological terms, but juxtaposes it with mechanical automata. Thinkers such as Julien Offrey de La Mettrie consistently follow this path when they no longer conceive of the body alone but man as a whole as a machine.[xliii]
IV. Conclusion
If we recall the narrative of E. T. A. Hoffmann in the introduction, the history of ideas shows us that this irreconcilable opposition of man and automaton barely explores the complex relationship between the soul and technology. In particular, the philosophical reflection of antiquity and early modernity uncovers manifold, deeper layers of the noetic and organic implications of the soul, which do not stand in the way of technical development but conversely signify the very beginnings of the modern history of technology. This refers not only to the uncovering and first machine processing of soul-based, cognitive structures, which hint at future possibilities of computer technology and digitalization.[xliv] Moreover, soul-material products of the world-soul, such as the human hand, can be regarded as early precursors of techno-philosophical approaches such as that of “organ projection” and “prothesis theory”, which hold that technical artefacts are to be understood as images of human organs or the human organism.[xlv] Admittedly, besides the opportunity to reflect on “psyche” and “techne”, disturbing tendencies are also becoming apparent. In particular, the separation of soul and body allows for the one-sided mechanization of each of the two components and illustrates – via the perception of the fear of loss in the sense of E.T.A. Hoffmann – the enduring human need for a holistic existence.
Notes:
[i] See E.T.A. Hoffmann, “Der Sandmann”, in id., Nachtstücke, Klein Zaches, Prinzessin Brambilla, Werke 1816-1820, hg. von H. Steinecke unter Mitarbeit von G. Allroggen, Deutscher Klassiker Verlag im Taschenbuch Bd. 36, Frankfurt am Main, 2017, pp. 11–49.
[ii] See Genesis 2:7.
[iii] See E. Levine, Heaven and Earth. Law and Love, Studies in Biblical Thought, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, vol. 303, Berlin, New York (de Gruyter), 2000, p. 12.
[iv] See B. Ego, “Adam und Eva im Judentum”, in Adam und Eva im Judentum, Christentum und Islam, hg. von C. Böttrich, B. Ego et al., Göttingen, Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 2011, p. 13.
[v] See W. Mesch, art. Psychê, in Wörterbuch der antiken Philosophie, hg. von C. Horn, C. Rapp, Becksche Reihe, München, C. H. Beck, 22008, pp. 380–381.
[vi] See Plato, Phaidon, Platonis Opera, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit J. Burnet, 5 vols. Oxford, e typographeo Clarendoniano, 1900-1907 [reprint 1979-1984], vol. I, 78 b-81 a.
[vii] Plato, Timaios, Platonis Opera, cit., vol. IV, 29 a.
[viii] See ibid, 34 a–b.
[ix] See Plato, Sophistes, Platonis Opera, cit., vol. I, 265 e.
[x] See [Aristotle] Aristotelis De anima, recognovit brevique adnotationem instruxit W.- D. Ross, Oxford, e typographeo Clarendoniano, 1956 [eight impression 1990], 412 a 19–412 b 9.
[xi] See [Thomas Aquinas] Thomae Aquinatis Summae contra gentiles libri quattuor – Thomas von Aquin, Summe gegen die Heiden, hg. und übersetzt von L. Albert und P. Engelhardt, zweiter Band, Buch 2, Texte zur Forschung, Band 16, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1982, cap. LXXII, p. 302.
[xii] See W. Mesch, art. Psychê, cit., pp. 382–383.
[xiii] See [Aristotle] Aristotelis De anima, cit., 413 a 4–7.
[xiv] Ibid., 412 b 5–6.
[xv] See ibid, 431 b 20-432 a 3. See H. Maye, “Einleitung” zu Ernst Kapp, Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik. Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Kultur aus neuen Gesichtspunkten, mit einer Einleitung hg. von H. Maye und L. Scholz, Philosophische Bibliothek Bd. 675, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 2015, pp. XXII-XXIII; G. Patzig, Gesammelte Schriften III, Aufsätze zur antiken Philosophie, Göttingen, Wallstein, 1996, p. 156.
[xvi] See [Plotinus] Plotins Schriften (a), übersetzt von R. Harder, Neubearbeitung mit griechischem Lesetext und Anmerkungen, Bd. I, “Enneade V 1”, 2, 1–28, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1956, pp. 210; 221.
[xvii] See [Plotinus] Plotins Schriften (b), übersetzt von R. Harder, Neubearbeitung mit griechischem Lesetext und Anmerkungen fortgeführt von R. Beutler und W. Theiler, Bd. II, “Enneade IV 4”, 16, 20-30, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1962, p. 276.
[xviii] [Plotin] Plotins Schriften (b), cit., Bd. III, “Enneade VI 6”, 4, 9-24, pp. 168, 170; VI 6, 9. 29-39, p. 182.
[xix] See W. Beierwaltes, Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, rote Reihe, 32014, pp. 72 ff.; pp. 118 ff.
[xx] See ibid., pp. 192 ff.
[xxi] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate – Über die Würde des Menschen, Lateinisch-Deutsch, übersetzt von N. Baumgarten, hg. und eingeleitet von A. Buck, Philosophische Bibliothek Bd. 427, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990, p. 6.
[xxii] See ibid.
[xxiii] See G. Bruno, La Cena de le ceneri – Das Aschermittwochsmahl, Italienisch-Deutsch, übersetzt von F. Fellmann, durchgesehen, verbessert und mit Einleitung, Kommentar und zwei Appendices hg. von A. Bönker-Vallon, mit der kritischen Edition von G Aquilecchia hg. von T. Leinkauf, Bd. 2, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 2019, pp. 128; 130.
[xxiv] See G. Bruno, De la causa, principio et uno – Über die Ursache, das Prinzip und das Eine, Italienisch-Deutsch, übersetzt, kommentiert und hg. von T. Leinkauf, mit der kritischen Edition hg. von T. Leinkauf, Bd. 3, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007, pp. 100; 156.
[xxv] See ibid., pp. 96; 98.
[xxvi] See [G. Bruno], “Lampas triginta statuarum”, in Jordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta, recensebat F. Fiorentino, F. Tocco et al., III, Neapel, Florenz, 1879-1891, 3 Bde. in acht Teilen [reprint Friedrich Frommann Verlag, Stuttgart Bad-Cannstatt, 1992], III, p. 61, 13-16.
[xxvii] See G. Bruno, De la causa, principio et uno, cit., p. 104.
[xxviii] See [G. Bruno] “De immenso et innummerabilibus”, in Jordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta, cit., I,2, p. 282.
[xxix] See G. Bruno, Cabala del cavallo pegaseo – Kabbala des pegaseischen Pferdes, Italienisch-Deutsch, auf der Grundlage der Übersetzung von K. Neubauer bearbeitet, kommentiert und hg. von S. Kodera, mit der kritischen Edition hg. von T. Leinkauf, Bd. 6, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009, p. 78.
[xxx] See R. Lullus, Ars brevis, übersetzt und mit einer Einführung hg. von A. Fidora, Lateinisch-Deutsch, Philosophische Bibliothek 518, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999, pp. 6 ff. See A. Fidora, Einführung zu R. Lullus, Arsbrevis, cit., pp. IX–XXXI.
[xxxi] See J. Berns, W. Neuber, “Mnemotechnik zwischen Renaissance und Aufklärung. Ein Ausblick”, in Ars memorativa. Zur kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung der Gedächtniskunst 1400-1750, hg. von J. J. Berns, W. Neuber, Frühe Neuzeit Bd.15, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1993, p. 376.
[xxxii] See T. Leinkauf, “Scientia universalis, memoria und status corruptionis. Überlegungen zu philosophischen und theologischen Implikationen der Universalwissenschaft sowie zum Verhältnis von Universalwissenschaft und Theorien des Gedächtnisses”, in Ars memorativa, cit., pp. 3-4.
[xxxiii] See J. J. Berns, W. Neuber, “Seelenmaschinen. Zur Konstruktion einer Gattungsgeschichte der mittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen ‘ars memorativa’, in Seelenmaschinen. Gattungstraditionen, Funktionen und Leistungsgrenzen der mnemotechniken vom späten Mittelalter bis zum Beginn der Moderne, hg. von J. J. Berns und W. Neuber, Böhlau Verlag, Wien et al., 2000, pp. 748–755.
[xxxiv] See [G. Bruno] “De monade, numero et figura”, in Jordani Bruni Nolani opera latine conscripta, cit., I,2, pp. 349 ff.
[xxxv] See ibid., p. 338.
[xxxvi] See A. Bönker-Vallon, Metaphysik und Mathematik bei Giordano Bruno, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1995, pp. 214–216.
[xxxvii] See J. J. Berns, W. Neuber, “Seelenmaschinen”, cit., pp. 748; 756-757.
[xxxviii] See J. Berns, W. Neuber, “Mnemotechnik zwischen Renaissance und Aufklärung”, cit., p. 377.
[xxxix] See [R. Descartes] “Meditationes de prima philosophia “, in Œuvres de Descartes, publiés par C. Adam et P. Tannery, vol. VII, Léopold Cerf, Paris, 1904, p. 3.
[xl] See [R. Descartes] “Principia philosophiae”, in Œuvres de Descartes, cit., vol. VIII, Léopold Cerf, Paris, 1905, p. 41, 3-23.
[xli] See [R. Descartes] “Meditationes de prima philosophia”, cit, p. 26, 18.
[xlii] See [R. Descartes] “Le Monde” [“Traité de l‘homme”] in Œuvres de Descartes, cit., vol. XI, Léopold Cerf, Paris, 1909, p. 120.
[xliii] See. B. Westermann, “Automaten”, in Technikanthropologie. Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Studium, hg. von M. Heßler und K. Liggieri, Edition Sigma, Baden Baden, Nomos, 2020, p. 252.
[xliv] See W. Hehl, Wechselwirkung. Wie Prinzipien der Software die Philosophie verändern, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg 2016, p. 100 ff.
[xlv] See E. Kapp, Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik. Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Kultur aus neuen Gesichtspunkten, mit einer Einleitung hg. von H. Maye und L. Scholz, Philosophische Bibliothek Bd. 675, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag 2015, pp. 40 ff.
Angelika Bönker-Vallon studied philosophy, history of sciences, German literature and theology at the Ludwigs-Maximilians-Universität Munich (Germany). She is a lecturer at the University of Kassel (Germany) with the special focus on philosophy of the Renaissance and co-editor of the bilingual edition of the Italian works by Giordano Bruno (Italian-German).
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